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As many students of tort and compensation law undoubtedly
are aware, New Zealand embarked on an experiment in law reform
and social change with the passage of the Accident Compensation
Act of 1972.1 The Act, together with subsequent amendments, bars
all causes of action for death or personal injury suffered by accident and substitutes a no-fault system employing state-administered compensation funds. In Compensationfor Incapacity,2 Geoffrey Palmer describes and analyzes the provisions of this
complicated legislative scheme, together with their likely effects on
New Zealand society, and chronicles the political processes that led
to the passage and implementation of the Act.
As an academic lawyer who has taught and published in his
native New Zealand as well as in Australia and the United States,
Palmer is uniquely qualified to write a book on this subject. He
was involved, sometimes intimately, for more than a decade in the
succession of commission reports and legislative drafting efforts
that culminated in the New Zealand reforms. His perspective as
participant and observer lends a lively immediacy to a technical
and complicated subject. Although his primary focus is upon New
Zealand, where the abolition of tort liability has become a reality,
for comparison he includes an account of similar legislation proposed, but not yet passed, in Australia.3
t Professor of Law, Boston University.
2 Stat. N.Z. 1409 (1975).
' G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY (1979) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as PALMER].
" E.g., id. at 131-96.
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Palmer has combined a readable style with an experienced intelligence to produce what should become a classic in the insurance
literature. For American legislators, lawyers, and scholars considering alternatives to tort liability, the book will provide an important
source of information and insight. Comparative lawyers also should
find it rewarding, and the book should enjoy a substantial audience
among nonlawyers interested in either the no-fault idea or the legislative and political processes by which legal and social changes
are effected.
Despite the book's general excellence, I am compelled to disagree with the two major conclusions to be drawn from the author's
analysis: first, that the New Zealand reforms are theoretically justifiable; and second, that the reforms are historically of great significance. After summarizing the substance of the reforms, I shall explain my disagreement with both conclusions.
I.

THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEW ZEALAND REFORMS

The Accident Compensation Act of 1972 in its original form
abolished rights to recover in tort and substituted rights to receive
no-fault compensation for personal injury or death suffered by
earners and motor vehicle accident victims. For the first group,
worker's compensation was extended to include employees and the
self-employed on a twenty-four-hour basis without a work-connection requirement. For the second group, a statute resembling the
automobile no-fault schemes implemented in a number of jurisdictions in this country was enacted.4 A year later, coverage under the
Act, together with the accompanying bar to recovery in tort, was
extended to all persons, including nonearners, suffering personal
injury or death by accident. The consequence of the expansion
was that the Act virtually eliminated liability in tort. Claimants
tortiously injured other than "by accident" may bring common law
actions; but the phrase "by accident" has been interpreted broadly
' On motor vehicle no-fault insurance in the United States, see Henderson, No-Fault
Insurance for Automobile Accidents: Status and Effect in the United States, 56 OR. L.
REv. 287 (1977); O'Connell, Operationof No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56
NEB. L. REv. 23 (1977); Note, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: An Evaluative Survey, 30
RUTGERS L. REv. 909 (1977). Many of the American plans are "mixed" in that some rights to
sue in tort (e.g., in serious cases) are reserved. Thus the comprehensiveness of the New
Zealand motor vehicle scheme renders it more ambitious than many of the American nofault plans.
See PALMER at 108-09, 271.
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enough to approach what Palmer describes as "the complete abolition of common law rights."'
Variable levies on employers and flat-rate levies on the selfemployed fund the coverage for earners; 7 variable levies on motor
vehicles fund the motor vehicle compensation system;s and appropriations by Parliament fund the supplemental scheme covering
nonearners. 9 In cases of overlapping coverage, the motor vehicle
coverage is primary. Illnesses not caused by accident are excluded,
thus creating the difficulty of distinguishing between an "accident"
and an "illness." 10 Willfully self-inflicted injuries also are excluded,
as is death due to suicide unless the suicide was caused by a state
of mind that was the result of a compensable accident.1 1 The Act
does not cover property damage. 2
Under the system, compensation is available for medical, rehabilitation, and funeral expenses; lost earnings and impairment of
earning capacity; some pecuniary losses other than medical expenses and lost earnings; nonpecuniary losses such as pain and suffering; loss of bodily function;1 3 and payments for support of dependents in death cases. 14 Medical expenses include reasonable
expenses for medical treatment and hospital care not paid for
under social security, ambulance expenses, nursing care expenses,
dental expenses, and expenses for artificial limbs. Full costs of rehabilitation are provided for, including a full-time personal attendant when necessary.1 5 Reasonable funeral expenses are covered.' 6
Compensation for lost earnings and reduced earning capacity
is equally generous. Earners and the self-employed are paid eighty
percent of their lost earnings up to a fairly high weekly limit. Except for certain persons,' 7 earnings are not imputed to nonearners.

6 Id. at 107.
7 See id. at 367.

See id. at 418.
'
10

See id. at 419.

See id. at 249-70. The distinctions that must be drawn under the Act sometimes

border on the ridiculous. If a person drinks contaminated water and becomes ill, presumably

he will not recover compensation; but if the same person contracts malaria from having been
bitten by a mosquito that came into contact with the water, he can recover because the bite
was an "accidental" injury. See id. at 252.
11See id. at 291.
12 See id. at 274.
13 See id. at 214-43.
14 See id. at 301-15.
15 See id. at 414.

16 See id. at 416.
17Earnings are imputed for children under 16 years of age and persons studying for, or
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Thus, a housewife accidentally incapacitated cannot recover lost
earnings that were not actually received on a regular basis prior to
the accident. Nonearners are allowed to receive all other elements
of compensation, however, including payments for loss of bodily
functions. 18
The New Zealand compensation system generally avoids
lump-sum payments. Medical expenses are paid when incurred and
payments for lost earnings are made periodically. 19 Lump-sum
payments are authorized only in exceptional circumstances.10 The
only significant exception is for some nonpecuniary losses, where
large lump-sum payments are expressly called for by the Act.2"
Widows, minor children, and other dependents of persons killed
accidentally are paid stated percentages of the amount the decedent would have received had he survived and been totally incapacitated. 22 Lump sums also are paid to surviving widows and minor children according to a schedule.2 3
Coverage under the Act extends to New Zealand residents-who
are injured by accident outside the country if the accident occurs
within twelve months after departure and if the claimant is either
an earner continuing to earn in New Zealand or a self-employed
person temporarily absent on business.2 Such persons presumably
are free to pursue tort claims overseas in addition to recovering
compensation in New Zealand. Members of the armed services also
are Covered while abroad, as are government employees assigned
overseas. 25 It is interesting that nonearners who are not government employees are not covered while out of the country-a member of the New Zealand Olympic hockey team injured in overseas
competition, for example, probably would be forced to seek recovery elsewhere than the compensation system. 21 Visitors to New
Zealand are covered by the system while in the country and are
barred from bringing tort actions for accidental injuries.2 7
The New Zealand system is administered by an Accident
beginning, a career or occupation. See id. at 413.
Is See id. at 413.
19 See id. at 412.
20
21

22

See id.
See id. at 223-24.
See id. at 415-16.

25

See id.
See id. at 417.
See id.

20

The hockey player will not recover unless he is an earner. Id. at 299-300.

27

See id. at 417.

23
24
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Compensation Commission comprised of three members, one of
whom must be a lawyer.28 Administration of the system reflects
something of a "catch-as-catch-can" quality. The primary agent
for levies is the Department of Inland Revenue, but levies on motor vehicles are collected by the Post Office as part of the annual
vehicle licensing operation. 29 Applications for compensation are
filed with the State Insurance Office, which serves as the Commission's sole disbursal agent except for a specialized company that
handles seamen's claims.3 0 The State Insurance Office has no authority to decline claims. 1 Instead, claims that are not granted are
referred to a Commission Officer.32 Claimants denied at this level
are entitled to a hearing before a Commissioner or hearing officer,
with the right to appeal to an Independent Appeal Authority.3
From there, a claimant may obtain judicial review by the Court of
Appeal and then by the Supreme Court.34 Palmer reports that the
number of applications for review has increased rapidly since the
Act was first implemented, as has the involvement of lawyers in
compensation cases35
The relationship between the compensation system and the
common law tort system presents interesting questions. As a general rule, tort actions are barred only in connection with accidental
injuries for which compensation is payable. Thus, because compensation may not be recovered for property damage, actions at law
will lie when property is tortiously damaged or destroyed.386 Coverage under the Act and the barring of tort claims are not coextensive, however. Strangely, the 1973 amendments, which are
designed to extend the Act's coverage, take away the right to proceed in tort in some situations that the extended coverage does not
reach.3 7 To prevent injustice, the drafters provided a curious solution: the amendments empower the Compensation Commission to
make ex gratia payments to persons who suffer injury by accident
18 See id. at 381. The administration of the system is described in id. at 381-403.
21 See id. at 384.
SOSee id.
1 See id. at 400.
32 See id. at 400-01.
33 See id. at 401.
I See id. at 402.
35 Id. at 401.
36 Palmer argues that damages for harm to property should not be recoverable in tort
when the accident also results in personal injuries. Id. at 274.
37 See id. at 272-73.
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but who are not covered by the Act.38 Also, by making the Commission's determination conclusive, the Act avoids a situation
where a claimant "falls between the stools" procedurally, that is,
where the Commission first denies a claim on the ground that no
statutory coverage exists, and a court then denies tort recovery because coverage does exist.3 9
The New Zealand compensation system is a funded, as opposed to a pay-as-you-go, system.40 An amount of money is collected and set aside each year that should be sufficient to pay all
future claims arising from injuries suffered during the year of collection. The amount necessary to fund the system in this manner is
calculated each year by estimating the value of all future claims
arising out of accidents occurring that year and reducing that estimate to present value at a conservative rate of interest. 41 If the
claims predictions are accurate and the discount rate employed approximates the actual rate of return received, there will be just
enough left from the monies collected in any given year to pay the
last claim for compensation. The cost estimates under the system
seem fairly accurate, although Palmer says this is not certain. 42
The claims rate has risen somewhat more rapidly than had been
anticipated, perhaps due to increasing public awareness of the
system.'3
Palmer is admirably candid in assessing the first four years'
experience, under a new system in which he obviously and passionately believes. He admits, for example, that-there "has been a tendency for people to claim for some rather curious matters." 44 His

narrative reveals that abuses have occurred in some industries in
" See id. at 273.
39 See id.

40For a description of the funding of the system, see id. at 338-44, 348-55, 360-61.
41See id. at 338-39.
42Id. at 344.
43Id. By the spring of 1978, the Commission was handling roughly 500 claims per day,
with an average period of 12 days between documentation and payment. Id. at 404.
44Examples include the cost of doing odd jobs around the home, the cost of an engine

hoist and luxury bed, cost of repairing window frames of a house, the cost of new shoes
of a soft sort made necessary by the injury, legal costs and land agent's fees incurred in
the sale of a house, recompense for time spent preparing papers for review and appeal,
cost of visiting a spouse in hospital, some money for relatives of an injured person who
helped him move house, cost of charitable donation made by injured person to a group
who cleared up garden, legal expenses for seeking solicitor's advice after being bitten
by a dog, and the cost of a pressure pump to clean a cow-yard.
Id. at 242. Palmer adds that "[slome of these claims were allowed although most were decined." Id.
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which employers are required to pay one hundred percent of the
employees' wages for the first week of incapacity arising out of
work-related injuries. Moreover, he describes the administration
of the system as "too often. . characterized by an abundance of
caution, a stubborn inflexibility, and an undue sensitivity to public
criticism. 4' Notwithstanding these flaws, however, the author insists that few of the problems relate to the fundamental principles
of the system. He concludes:
Against the difficulties encountered must be matched the
achievements of the new scheme. There is much less room for
argument... than there was under the common law. Everyone who is incapacitated is paid and paid quickly in most
cases. The social problem posed by the uncompensated victim
has disappeared. Rather than providing a brake on rehabilitation the new scheme promotes it. The removal of the right to
sue has been accompanied by no floods of protests. The common law action for personal injury in New Zealand has been
buried and there is no demand for its exhumation. 7

II. Is THE NEW ZEALAND SYSTEM

THEORETICALLY JUsTIIABLE?

A generally accurate if oversimplified summary of Palmer's
answer to this question might be as follows: Of course the New
Zealand compensation system is theoretically justifiable, because it
solves the important social problem of the uncompensated accident
victim. Before 1973, the common law tort system in New Zealand
addressed this problem inadequately. The rules governing liability
were vague and difficult to apply. The common law system resembled a game of chance: most accident victims recovered nothing,
while those who were successful often received too little, too late.
To make matters worse, the tort system absorbed an outrageously
high percentage of benefits in the form of attorney's fees. The deterrent effect on conduct of exposure to tort liability was diminished by the widespread reliance on liability insurance. By responding to these shortcomings, the New Zealand compensation
system provides a fair and efficient solution to a significant social
problem. Instead of a relatively small fraction being entitled to
compensation, all accident victims who suffer personal injury are
45

Id. at 373.

44 Id. at 404.

" Id. at 405.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[48:781

covered. Benefits in most cases are more generous than under the
common law, and are paid more promptly. Rehabilitation is a
stated goal and a realized objective. The system's negative impact
on allocative efficiency, although regrettable, probably is exaggerated and is in any event acceptable in light of the gains in social
welfare.
The primary problem with Palmer's rationale is accepting his
first premise, namely, that the failure of the New Zealand common
law tort system to compensate everyone who suffered injury was an
"important social problem." The common law never was intended
as a means of accomplishing such a compensation objective. Even
if one accepts the premise that every injured victim should be compensated, the insistence of the New Zealand system that in order
to be compensable the injuries must be suffered "accidentally" is
clearly inconsistent with that premise. Furthermore, the system's
potential negative effects on allocative efficiency, rather than having been exaggerated, have been underestimated. In the
paragraphs that follow, I shall consider each of these points in
turn.
A.

The Failure to Compensate Some Accident Victims Was Not a
Significant Social Problem

One who believes that accident victims who recover little or
nothing through the tort system present a significant social problem probably is thinking of the relatively few instances in which
serious and permanent injuries cause great financial hardship for
the victims and their families. Such cases do occur, and some are
tragic. But there was no strong correlation in New Zealand between suffering accidental injury and experiencing financial hardship. Only a small percentage of accident victims encountered
significant financial hardships, 4 8 because of the availability of free
medical care 49 and, for many accident victims, of other benefits,
including public welfare and personal savings. To the unfortunate
few who fell into the hardship category, of course, the problems
48 Studies of automobile accident cases in the United States, for example, indicate that
a small percentage (no more than five percent) of accident victims suffer significant dislocation costs. See 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT oP TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUToMOBILE ACCIDENTS 362, Table 56FS (1970). It seems reasonable to assume that in New Zealand, with its greater public welfare programs, the percentage was no higher, and probably
lower.
49 See Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the United States:
Some Striking Similarities, 27 STAN. L. REv. 653, 656-57 (1975).
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were significant. But it would seem more realistic to view this minority as part of the problem of poverty than as part of the problem of uncompensated accident victims. Given New Zealand's
traditional commitment to ambitious welfare programs aimed at
helping the poor and the disadvantaged, it may not even have been
a significant poverty problem.
Thus, the New Zealand compensation system can be justified
on the basis of social welfare principles only if those principles are
expanded to include welfare for those not in particular financial
need. Indeed, the book reveals that such an expansion of social
welfare is precisely what is involved.5 0 Although Palmer cites a
vivid "hardship" case at the outset to show how the tort system
fails those in great need of assistance, 51 the New Zealand compensation system is mainly concerned with delivering benefits to persons who need them only in the sense that they would otherwise be
financially inconvenienced.
Palmer admits that this is, in essence, a social welfare system
for the middle and upper-middle classes. He describes the concerns voiced in New Zealand over whether the system might divert
public attention from the question of adequacy of welfare benefits
for the poor; 52 and he addresses the policy questions inherent in
having a system that provides benefits to those who do not need
them."3 But the book conveys the impression that the compensation system addressed a pressing and significant social problem in
much the same way that an airlift of food and medical supplies
alleviates the problems presented by a flood or an earthquake. In
fact, such an impression is mistaken. The circumstances the compensation system addresses deserve to be called "significant social
problems" only if that label applies to all unexpected disruptions,
great or small, in the economic status of individuals.

80 Palmer refers to "a new sort of welfare state." PALMER at 56. Referring to the earn-

ings-related nature of the benefits for incapacity, he explains:
The position involves acceptance of the proposition that the person on $15,000 a year
has a claim to be supported at a level proportionate to that amount and "deserves"
more than the person on $5,000 a year....
. . . [T]he idea [is] that everyone lives up to their income whatever it is.
Id. at 324-25.
51 Id. at 13-22. The case involved a motor vehicle accident. Palmer characterizes the
trial as "an Alice-in-Wonderland fantasy." Id. at 22.
:2
3

Id. at 325.
Id. at 221-22, 325-27.
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B. The Common Law Tort System Never Purported to Address
All Unexpected Financial Hardships of Individuals
The book implies that the tort system failed in its efforts to
compensate to accident victims and therefore deserved to be replaced with a more efficient means of providing compensation."
Palmer recognizes that the first part of this statement is
wrong-tort law never set out to compensate victims of misfortune. 5 But the impression conveyed by the book is to the contrary.
A mistaken interpretation of the actual objectives of tort law
pervades Palmer's thesis, as it did the analysis of the reformers
who supported the Act. The reformers understood that the expanded no-fault compensation system could become a reality only
if it replaced the tort system, because otherwise the need for new
funding would be so great as to render unattractive any expanded
commitment to compensation. Thus, there had to be an "utterly
devastating" attack on the common law.56 If the reformers had focused on the true objectives of tort law-the enhancement of social
utility and the promotion of shared notions of fairness 57 -the attack would have fallen short. The reformers possessed no empirical
data to support conclusions that the "tort system had failed to
achieve either of these objectives, 8 so the focus of attention had to
be shifted to the compensation objective for the attack to succeed.
Indeed, once the compensation objective is considered paramount,
it is self-evident that a system promising "integrated and comprehensive.

. .

compensation that is usually swift and sure" is prefer-

able to one that offers only "[u]ncertain, uncoordinated, and
capricous remedies."5 9
Thus, the strategy of reform that led to the Act was to attack
the tort system for failing to achieve an objective that it never purported to recognize and then to belittle as tangential and ineffective its efforts to enhance utility and fairness.60 Palmer uses this
54 "The most frequent charge levelled against the [tort] system stems from its failure to
compensate all accident victims." Id. at 23.
55 Id. at 35.
56 Id. at 25.
57 See text and notes at 78-79 infra.
" PALMIER at 26.
59 Id. at 405.
60 Id. at 23-25. Even when he tries to explain the goals of tort law in a positive way,
Palmer finds it difficult. He describes (and dismisses) the deterrence objective in an offhand
manner; he says, for example: "The effectiveness of tort law as a deterrrent has been the
subject of great debate but whatever efficacy it had has undoubtedly been reduced with the
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same strategy to persuade readers of the desirability of the New
Zealand system. Although he includes all of the arguments relevant
to the underlying policy issues, his confessed bias causes him to
stack the deck at every opportunity.61
62
I, too, have vigorously attacked the common law tort system.
Where I differ with Palmer, however, is on how to remedy the
shortcomings of the common law. He focuses on compensation
rather than utility and fairness, and advocates a complete replacement of the tort system. I urge that we continue to focus on utility
and fairness, and that we change only so much of the tort system
as needs changing. An example of our different viewpoints is our
reactions to the use of a significant proportion of insurance premiums in the tort system to cover insurance company overhead and
to compensate lawyers who handle claims. Palmer views these expenditures as impediments to the compensation objective, and
urges that they be eliminated whenever possible.6 By contrast, I
view these expenditures as essential to the utility and fairness
objectives, and would seek to reduce them only when they are unnecessarily high. 5
Although Palmer belittles the ability of tort law to enhance
either utility or fairness, he does recognize the legitimacy of both
objectives. 6 And although I believe that utility and fairness are
advent of widespread liability insurance." Id. at 35-36.
41 The author confesses his bias and recognizes its effects on his analysis. "My increasing personal involvement in the process of reform has made it impossible to preserve the
sort of scholarly detachment usually expected from those who chronicle important social
changes. My point of view is that of a committed believer in the type of reform with which
this book deals." Id. at 11. His bias is sometimes obvious, as when he begins a chapter with
a quotation from Professor Ison: "[L]iability for negligence is a capricious and unsatisfactory method of compensating the victims of injury and disease." Id. at 23. Other times it is
subtle; summarizing his analysis, for example, he explains: "So far we have seen how...
[tort law] works in practice, inspected a catalogue of its weaknesses, and compared its importance with other means of support." Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
42 See, e.g., Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat From the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturers'Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1531 (1973). Palmer cites my
work to support some of his criticisms of the common law tort system. PALMER at 45 n.56.
" See, e.g., Henderson, Manufacturers'Liability for Defective Product Desigrn A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. Rlv.625 (1978).
" See PALER at 23-24, 381, 385.
" Insofar as one views the tort system as performing functions other than insuring
against losses, the costs of running the system may be acceptable even if relatively high. In
contrast, Palmer's objective is to return the highest possible percentage of premium dollars
to claimants. For him, costs may be unacceptable even if relatively low. See id. at 385.
66Id. at 31, 35, 362-65.
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sacrificed to too great an extent in the New Zealand scheme, I recognize the legitimacy and necessity of the no-fault idea in more
limited contexts. 67 Even with these caveats, however, there is some
mutual exclusivity between the objectives of universal compensation and utility and fairness. It is probable that, to a significant
extent, the one objective is accomplished only at the expense of the
other.6 s The problem with Palmer's treatment of the objectives is
not that he has clearly chosen the wrong one to emphasize, but
that he has failed to develop the implications of his choice. By
adopting the rhetorical strategy that led to political victory in 1972
and 1973-attacking the tort system for its ineffectivenss as a
means of accomplishing an objective at which it never was
aimed-he assumes away some of the most philosophically interesting aspects of his thesis.
C.

The New Zealand System Is an Inadequate Solution to the
Problem of Financial Disruptions

I have expressed doubts about the significance of the uncompensated-victim problem and disagreement with attempts to blame
the tort system for its ineffectiveness as a compensation mechanism. Here I am willing to assume for the sake of arkument that a
problem exists and that more than tort liability is required to solve
it. My criticism of the New Zealand system in this context is that
there is no reason why victims of misfortunes other than accidents
should not have equally valid claims to compensation as accident
victims. Why, for example, should the working person whose leg
must be amputated because of cancer be denied benefits because
he lost his leg through disease rather than by accident? Diseases
such as cancer may often cause more significant disruptions in people's lives than accidents.
One answer offered by some proponents of the New Zealand
reform seems truly remarkable: they extended the compensation
system to include only accident victims because that is as far as
67 See Henderson, Book Review, 56 B.U.L. REv. 830 (1976), in which I reviewed Professor Jeffrey O'Connell's proposals for elective no-fault plans. My problems with his proposal
are mostly problems of implementation, not basic principle. I have also written favorably on

the prospects for no-fault approaches to medical accidents. See

DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE

SYsTEM: A Fasmiuvv STmY 53-101 (1979) (study sponsored by the ABA Comm'n on
Medical Professional Liability). The important feature shared by these plans is their commitment in principle to allocative efficiency.
See text and notes at notes 80-82 infra.
EVENT
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the common law tort system extended. 9 The statement must be
considered in connection with another argument advanced earlier
by these same reformers in a different context: "The tort system
deserves to be replaced because it fails to extend accident compensation far enough."7 0 It appears that the tort system's benefits policy is either to be condemned as short sighted or relied upon for
support, depending on whether it suits the reformers' purposes.
The real reasons for limiting the New Zealand system to accident victims have little to do with basic principles. An important
point in favor of the reforms of 1972 and 1973 was the promise
that the total cost of the new system would not exceed the cost of
the old; the savings generated by dismantling the tort system were
to cover the additional costs of extending benefits to all accident
victims."1 There also may have been a few vague promises of actually reducing total costs; similar promises, rather than an appeal to
basic principles, generated much of the support for motor vehicle
no-fault legislation in the United States in the early 1970s. No
such promises of holding costs constant, or reducing them, would
have been possible if harm associated with diseases were included
along with accidental injuries, so the line was drawn at accidents.
7
To the stirring reformist rhetoric of "community responsibility" '
and "comprehensive entitlement"7 3 was added the unspoken contradictory phrase, "so long as it does not add to our costs."
Palmer does criticize the New Zealand system for failing to
cover diseases and congenital disabilities, and he urges that the
system be amended to cover them. 4 Of course, if the 1972 and
1973 reforms are but an initial step toward a more comprehensive
and internally consistent system, the present criticisms lose much
of their force. But based upon the information in this book, I
doubt that coverage will be significantly extended. 5 Nothing is
likely to occur that will make the question of added costs any easier to answer; and some of the problems of abuse under the present
system7 6 probably will become more significant with the passage of

"'See PALmER at 316.
70 See note 54 supra.
71See PALMER at 365.

72Id. at 56.
73Id.
74 Id.

at 327.

75 In an addendum dated October 1979, Palmer indicates that no important changes

are in sight. Id. at 407.
71See id. at 242, 373.
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time, exacerbating the problem of costs. If the New Zealand system is not expanded, what will have emerged from the reforms is a
system that violates the principle of compensating victims of unexpected misfortune even as it purports to embody that principle.
One may wonder whether the critics who spoke of the "false morality" of tort law 7 will be able to appreciate the hyprocrisy reflected
in the system they helped create.
D.

The New Zealand System Is Likely to Have Negative Effects
on Allocative Efficiency and Fairness

The tort system's objectives include the enhancement of allocative efficiency and the promotion of shared notions of fairness.
The former objective is accomplished by deterring unacceptably
risky conduct, 78 the latter by providing private remedies against
those who commit wrongs. 9 The tort system does fail to compensate some accident victims who have suffered loss, but it must neglect the compensation objective if it is to accomplish the others.
Replacing the tort system with a compensation system may well
generate benefits only at the cost of detracting from efficiency and
fairness.8 0
The book supports both of my conclusions. Palmer recognizes
the problem of the effects on allocative efficiency: "One problem of
such loss-spreading programs for all injuries is that incentives for
safety may be lost unless care is taken to draw the contributions
for payment of the scheme from activities that engender the injury
losses. 1 His point about "incentives for safety" requires further
examination. Generally, if actors are not required to pay a fair
share of the costs of their activities, including the accident costs,
they will tend to overengage in those activities whose costs they
can most successfully escape from paying.8 2 Thus, if everyone were
required to pay into a universal accident compensation fund on a
77 Id.

at 24, 27.

The tort system deters in two basic ways: specifically, by causing actors to modify
their conduct in order to escape liability;, and generally, by forcing actors to bear the costs of
avoiding accidents or insuring against them. Some actors will decide not to engage in activities that have high avoidance or insurance costs. On the subject of specific and general deterrence, see G. CALABREsi, THE CosTS op AccmamTS (1970).
7 Fairness in tort admittedly is a vague, largely intuitive concept. For a recent effort to
render it more intelligible, see Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L.
71

REV.

537 (1972).
80
81
82

See text and notes at notes 66-68 supra.
PALMER at 53.
For Palmer's treatment of this subject, see id. at 362-65.
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flat-rate, per capita basis, those who engaged in comparatively safe
activities would pay more than their share of the total accident
costs generated by all activities, and those who engaged in relatively risky activities would pay less. The resulting wealth transfers
would encourage actors at the margin (those indifferent to which
sort of activities to engage in) to switch from safe to risky activities. Not everyone would switch, but enough would to cause the
overall accident costs in the society to increase over what they
would have been if those engaging in relatively safe activities had
not been required to subsidize their risk-preferring fellow citizens.
Resources would be misallocated to relatively risky activities; the
increase in accident costs would constitute social waste.
The solution to this problem of waste, one that to a limited
extent was incorporated in the New Zealand scheme, is to require
contribution to the compensation fund in proportion to the risk of
accidents created by the actor. If the amount contributed is appropriate, the proper balance between safe and risky activities will be
achieved. The tort system consciously aims at attaching the appropriate price tags to risky conduct, 8 but there is no reason in theory
why a system providing universal compensation could not do the
same thing."
Palmer addresses these issues in some of the most interesting
sections of the book.8 5 The problem is practical: how can the costs
be properly allocated among accident-generating activities? The
sponsors of the New Zealand system apparently believed they
could achieve adequate safety incentives by providing separate
83 Under a negligence system, activities will reflect the costs of avoiding accidents. In
theory, if one assumes zero transaction costs, those are the only "accident-related" costs
that will be reflected-all actors will act reasonably and escape liability by investing adequately in avoidance measures. Under a strict liability rule, activities will also reflect the
expense of insuring against accident costs that cannot be avoided efficiently. To the extent
that the tort system achieves the general deterrence objective, it does so more effectively
under a strict liability approach. Strict products liability, for example, causes the prices of
various commercially supplied products to reflect their relative defect-related accident costs.
Palmer never really addresses the role of strict products liability, although he mentions its
development, id. at 42-43. His attack is on the "negligence system" more than on the "tort
system"; when he thinks of a "tort case," he thinks of one like the automobile accident case
he uses as an example at the outset. See text and note at note 51 supra.
In theory, nothing prevents the separation of the pay-in and the pay-out mechanisms. So long as the pay-in mechanism is related to risk or cost, general deterrence will be
achieved regardless of how the pay-out mechanism is designed. For an interesting recent
proposal making this point and calling for a government-operated system of cost internalizations (pay ins) and compensation (pay outs), see Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits

of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281 (1980).
85See PALMER at 362-80.
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funds for earners and motor vehicles supported by independent,
variable levies. The annual levies on motor vehicles in 1978, for
example, varied from $2.00 to $86.25, depending on the type, size,
and estimated risk potential.8" But the levies reflected relative
risks crudely; for example, all privately owned automobiles were
assessed at $14.20.87 Palmer points out that such a flat rate makes
no attempt to distinguish among vehicles by factors affecting risks,
even such obvious ones as the varying amounts of use automobiles
receive. He suggests a fuel tax as a more appropriate method of
funding the motor vehicle compensation scheme.18
Despite his fuel tax suggestions, Palmer sees little likelihood
of achieving adequate safety incentives under the New Zealand
scheme. He sets forth his conclusions as follows:
In the injury reforms in New Zealand... the economic
deterrence issue caused a good deal of debate with wide differences of opinion. . . . There is a reasonable consensus of
opinion that the effort to rate differentially should be made.
Few people actually get down to the administrative problem
of designing an actual system of contributions which is based
on reliable data, achieves a high degree of internalization of
accident costs, is reasonably cheap to administer, and is fair. I
began as a firm believer in the validity of the theory; I have
ended up as a skeptic as to whether any scheme capable of
implementation will achieve much by the way of economic deterrence, at least so long as it is attached to a compensation
scheme. Knowledge about accident prevention is, however, in
such a primitive state, that anything offering a hope of reducing accidents should be tried. 9
As these comments indicate, the sources of Palmer's pessimism are
lack of information and costs of administration. Our knowledge of
which activities generate which costs is inadequate; even given
such knowledge, the cost of imposing differential levies reflecting
such information would be too great.90 The tort system spends sig86Id. at 369.
87

Id.

"Id. The tort system is entitled to low marks for the way it has handled motor vehicle
accidents, from the perspective of achieving allocative efficiency. This judgment also applies
to those states in this country that have adopted no-fault automobile insurance plans. See

note 4 supra.
PALmR at 380.
"

For some activities, the costs of imposing levies would be prohibitive. Activities of
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nificant sums trying to achieve more finely tuned cost allocations.

1

One who would dismantle the tort system to eliminate those expenditures will not welcome suggestions that the overhead of the
compensation system be increased to achieve more informed cost
allocations.
In addition to considering the potential negative effects on allocative efficiency of moving to a compensation system such as the
one adopted in New Zealand, such a move must be assessed from
the standpoint of shared notions of fairness. A New Zealand-type
system can be criticized on several fairness grounds. First, citizens
would no longer have some of the traditional methods of vindicating individual rights in our legal system. A person intentionally
struck by another, for example, would no longer be entitled to a
legal judgment that his right to personal integrity had been violated.9 2 Second, the anomalies created by the Act are open to attack. For example, distinctions drawn between illness and accidental injury under the system cause persons similarly disadvantaged
to be treated differently. Third, the measures of recovery include a
number of arbitrary limits that cause persons dissimilarly disadvantaged to receive essentially the same benefits.9 3 Finally, the
procedures under the compensation system reflect a willingness to
sacrifice the interests of the individual to the greater good.9
These criticisms of the New Zealand system do not suggest
that the common law tort system achieves nearly perfect fairness.
In areas of tort law that have come to be dominated by vague rules
and excessive reliance on supposed experts and lay juries, fairness
can sometimes be difficult to detect. But the tort system creates
the appearance, at least, of trying to reach individualized results
that are fair to all concerned. If the necessary reforms of the rules
individuals in general would be hard to reach. On the related question of whether such
activities can be reached by strict products liability, see Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict ProductsLiability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 1036, 1048 (1980).
91 Tort law may not succeed in achieving finely tuned allocations, however. There are
reasons for suspecting that it falls well short of perfection. See generally Morris, Enterprise
Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554
(1961).
*2 For a discussion of the desirability of barring assault or battery actions, see PALMER
at 277.
93 Id. at 227. I am not suggesting that a New Zealand-type system would for these
reasons necessarily be open to challenge on constitutional grounds. Palmer suggests that
federalism might hamper enactment of such a scheme in the United States. Id. at 406.
" The remedies under a tort system are tailor-made to fit individual cases; a compensation system cannot afford such "luxuries." See id. at 229-33.
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and processes of decision in the tort system were achieved, the appearance might begin to conform more closely to reality. Moving
from a properly functioning common law tort system to a system
like that in New Zealand might cause many citizens to feel that
traditional commitments to fairness had been compromised or
even abandoned. Although more victims of misfortune would be
receiving benefits under the new regime and in a democracy it may
be presumed that the appropriate balance of interests has been
struck, I would not be surprised to discover a general feeling in the
community that fairness to the individual had been sacrificed in
the name of the greatest good for the greatest number.
Has there been such a feeling in New Zealand? Palmer admits
that "[t]he administration of the Act. . . has not matched the vision of the original blueprint. '95 But he insists that the system has
worked for four years "without much sign of public dissatisfaction."98 He suggests that many of the difficulties are due to administrative suspicions about claims, and concludes that "[flew of the
problems relate to the fundamental principles of the scheme."97
But if significant numbers of persons have experienced frustration
in dealing with the New Zealand system, that may be the product
of the system itself rather than of overworked or uninspired clerks.
On balance, however, Palmer's conclusion that New Zealanders are happy with the changes made in 1972 and 1973 is convincing. Thus, it probably is true that "[t]he common law action
for personal injury in New Zealand has been buried and there is no
' Although the compensation reforms
demand for its exhumation." 98
appear successful in New Zealand, it is doubtful that the tort system would succumb so easily in the United States. Palmer attributes the probable resistance to such a change in this country to
what he sees as support for the common law tort system by powerful vested interests.9 9 This may be a significant factor, but it is not
the only factor; rather, I believe that the sentiment favoring the
tort system in this country is widely shared by its citizens. Apart
from the opposition of trial lawyers, public dissatisfaction on fairness grounds with a proposal to embrace a New Zealand-type system probably would be widespread.

"Id.

at 404.

8Id.

Id. at 405.

8Id.

Id. at 406.
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III.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Some American readers may conclude from this book that,
from the initial Royal Commission Report in 1967 to passage of
the Accident Compensation Act of 1972, New Zealand experienced
a legal and social revolution aimed at the shortcomings and abuses
of the common law tort system. Palmer repeatedly employs
phrases such as "changing the law to meet new demands,"100 and
refers to "big policy changes" 101 and "radical" solutions in characterizing the changes.10 2 He quotes New Zealand newspapers as
describing the 1972 Act as "breathtaking" and "so revolutionary
that interested parties had been stunned into silence."103 His account of the events leading to passage of the Act conveys a sense of
mounting frustration over the failures of the old system coupled
with growing excitement over the prospects for the new.Y"
Despite the views of Palmer and the New Zealand press, however, when the reforms of 1972 and 1973 are placed in their proper
historical perspective they are neither radical nor revolutionary.
This is not to deprecate the New Zealand experience nor to suggest
that Palmer has deliberately misled his readers. Technically, the
New Zealand reforms are significantly innovative, and Palmer cannot be faulted for expressing his enthusiasm with having observed
and participated in an intellectually exciting experience. But
judged in relation to the social context of New Zealand in the
1970s, the Accident Compensation Act of 1972 did not represent
the momentous social revolution that American readers, imagining
the implications of a similar change in this country, are likely to
assume it was.
There are several reasons for this conclusion, which are derived from the book. First, there was no public outcry in New Zealand over the deficiencies of the tort system. To the contrary, the
reformers readily admitted that there was an almost total absence
of public demand for change.10 5 One reason for this lack of demand
may have been that New Zealand is a sparsely populated, economically prosperous country that has long prided itself on making sub100Id. at 11.
101Id. at 83.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 74-75.
I0 To do this, Palmer relies in part on data from the United States indicating that the
tort system is in trouble. Id. at 48-49.
105 Id. at 83.
102
108
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stantial commitments to public welfare programs. Another is that,
except for the automobile-accident area, the tort system had not
expanded in New Zealand to the point of taxing the limits of the
judicial process. Indeed, the areas of medical malpractice and
products liability, thought by some observers to be in a crisis in
the United States, 10 6 were not a significant problem in New Zealand. 107 The relative paucity of tort cases in New Zealand seems
attributable mostly to a lower level of litigiousness, rather than to
any deficiencies in the system of tort law.
To be sure, the New Zealand no-fault system for motor vehicle
accidents replaced an active area of tort law. But this part of the
1972 reform was hardly a startling innovation. Not only had many
jurisdictions in the United States and elsewhere already adopted
that particular type of reform, but New Zealand had defeated only
narrowly a motor vehicle no-fault system proposal as early as
1928.108
If the tort system played a less significant role in New Zealand
than it does in the United States, and if there was no public demand for change, why did the change in New Zealand come about?
The answer is that a small group of judges and legal academics
launched an attack on the tort system, based solely on principle
and rhetoric, and saw a bipartisan, uncontroversial reform proposal
enacted by a largely indifferent Parliament. No interest groups opposed the measure; Parliament passed it without a single dissenting vote; and there have been few, if any, postenactment repercussions. Thus, except for the motor vehicle no-fault proposal, which
has counterparts in this country, the New Zealand reforms abolished a tort system that was far less significant than the American
one and replaced it with a welfare scheme that represented relatively modest extensions of existing social welfare programs.
Midway through his description and analysis of the New Zealand experience, Palmer offers the following observation: "In general it is true to say that the larger the change contemplated in a
democratic parliamentary system, the more difficult that change
106See AMEmCAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFES-

SIONAL RESPONSMrrY 9-12 (1977); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIAmrITY 333 (1978).
107 In 1970, for example, there were only 60 arguably serious medical malpractice claims
in the entire country, and insurance premiums for doctors that year ranged from $17 to $28.
PALMER at 43.
108 See id. at 65.
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will be to achieve."' 10 9 In light of the relative ease with which the
changes in New Zealand were accomplished, I can only conclude
that they were less significant than Palmer believes.
CONCLUSION

If reforms such as have been enacted in New Zealand were
proposed for implementation in the United States, I would oppose
them for several reasons. First, uncompensated accident victims
present a relatively low priority social problem. Second, apart from
the magnitude of the costs involved, abolishing tort liability and
moving to a universal compensation system for all victims of accidents and illnesses would have serious negative effects on allocative efficiency and shared notions of fairness. Finally, despite my
strong criticism of expansionary trends in American tort law, reforms aimed at curbing judicial excess should be given a chance to
work before the tort system is scrapped altogether." 0
Notwithstanding this criticism, Compensation for Incapacity
should be taken seriously. It is one of the most intelligent and
readable books on no-fault compensation in the literature. Palmer
frequently anticipates criticisms and candidly addresses troubling
conceptual points. Moreover, when I describe the New Zealand reforms as being less significant than one might have imagined, I
make that assessment in the context of a society traditionally committed to ambitious public welfare programs and not nearly so dependent on tort law as our own. I do not intend to belittle the New
Zealand experience; on the contrary, I view it as an intellectual triumph of humanism over self-interest. A small group of intelligent
people advanced a principle consistent with their country's traditions and won nearly universal support for it, even from those
called upon to sacrifice their own interests. I may disagree with
them on the merits, but I certainly admire their style.

109 Id. at 197.
110

See text and note at note 63 supra.

